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INTRODUCTION
The American lawyer has given relatively little attention to possi-
ble remedies of a restitutionary nature as alternatives for the more
well-known and understood remedies of damages and specific per-
formance in contract cases. When he did venture into the area of
restitution, he usually limited his exploration to quasi-contract for he
has been traditionally more at ease there.1 This was probably due to the
successful missionary work of William A. Keener's treatise.2 Professor
Keener's work was not so successful that additional understanding is no
longer needed with regard to quasi-contracts, however.3 Still less under-
stood has been the modern use of the remedies of constructive trust and
equitable lien to give specific restitution effects rather than money resti-
tution. It is submitted that the imaginative use of these remedies can
assist the lawer in developing extraordinarily effective techniques for the
recovery of specific property or for the security of an interest in a
performance already completed. This should be especially true where
a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties to a contract
can be found. Through the constructive trust and the equitable lien it
is possible that tracing principles may also be made available as they
have been in other contexts where these remedies were used.4
THE RIGHT To REsTiTUTION
The substantive right to restitution is based upon the prevention of
unjust enrichment.' It seems clear that unjust enrichment should in-
clude not only those cases where the defendant receives a benefit which
he should not retain but also those cases where the plaintiff suffers an
unjust detriment without a corresponding benefit in the defendant.
Moses v. Macferlan first delineated the basic principle of restitution in
*Professor of Law, Assistant to the Dean, Rutgers, The State University.
1 In his lectures on jurisprudence in 1832, John Austin established contracts,
quasi-contracts and delicts as the rights in personam. 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE
55 (4th ed. 1873).
2 KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS (1893).
3 Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. REV.
223, 224 (1936).
44 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 462-63 (2d ed. 1956).
5 Seavey and Scott, Restitution, 54 LAW Q. REV. 29, 32 (1938) ; Thurston,
Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-47, 45 MICH. L. REV. 935, 936 (1947).
62 Burr. 1005 (1760).
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our common law jurisdictions. Lord Mansfield indicated that under
the circumstances of the case before him, the defendant was obliged by
the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money. The prin-
ciples by which a person secures a right to restitution are the same
whether he seeks to use legal or equitable remedies. While it is essential
first to establish a right to restitution before one can use the equitable
remedies of constructive trust or equitable lien to perfect that right,
not all rights to restitution give rise to such equitable remedies. 7  In
many circumstances, for example, equitable remedies are denied be-
cause an adequate remedy at law exists,' yet equitable remedies may be
available where legal ones are not because of the limitations which law
courts may have imposed upon themselves. It also is clear that legal
remedies may be pursued in cases where equitable remedies are available.
For example, an action for the money value of specific property may be
pursued although an alternative remedy of constructive trust or equi-
table lien could have been exercised by the plaintiff. The disregarding
of these equitable remedies may not always be wise, for the lawyer
may find greater advantages in pursuing them on behalf of his client
than in being content to secure a judgment for money only.
Tracing as a result of establishing an equitable lien or to perfect
the constructive trust has already been mentioned9 as a possible ad-
vantage. A money judgment lien must be perfected and is effective
only when this has occurred. The equitable lien or constructive trust
will operate from the time the equity arose in many jurisdictions and
can only be cut off generally by one who is a third party bona fide
purchaser. The actual securing of the specific property is an obvious
advantage in constructive trust and an equitable lien assists in forcing
the sale of specific property. The successful beneficiary of a constructive
trust or a lien holder is protected where insolvency of the defendant is
involved. Liens and trusts imposed by law also remove property from
exemption claims by debtors."0
The right to restitution from a party who has wholly failed to
perform his part of a contract is firmly established in our law."
American courts have even gone so far as to say that there is a right
of restitution from a defendant who has partially performed where the
defendant has committed a substantial breach or repudiated his agree-
7 RESTATEIENT, RESTITUTION 4 (1937).
8 Comment, Must the Remedy at La'w Be Inadequate Before a Constructive
Trust Will Be Impressed.?, 25 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 283 (1951).
9 4 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 4.
10 See Note, 56 DICK. L. REv. 235, 243 (1952).
11 Ginther v. Shultz, 40 Ohio St. 104 (1883). See RESTATE.INENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 274, 313, 347, 354 (1932).
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ment so long as the parties can be restored to the status quo ante.'2
The breach must be a substantial one to give rise to a right of resti-
tution."3 Otherwise, th6 plaintiff is restricted to an action to secure
damages for the breach of contract. 4
Mr. Williston refers to this right as "right of rescission and resti-
tution,"1x5 while Mr. Corbin is opposed to the use of such a term. 6 He
also indicates that this is not a quasi-contract right, but a right which
gives rise to one of two or more alternative remedies given to the plain-
tiff as a result of the breach of contract -by the defendant." In most
cases, it is an alternative right to prevent unjust enrichment.' 8
Since the right of restitution arises to prevent injustice we must
look for cumulative evidence which demonstrates that an unjust loss by
the plaintiff or unjust gain by the defendant has occurred. Single facts,
such as an unjustifiable, willful, material breach by the defendant after
a performance by the plaintiff of his duties under a contract may be the
capstone which causes the right to arise. It does not follow that all
rights to restitution have equitable remedies available to vindicate those
rights.
The evidence creating the right of restitution may well be of such
a nature that an equitable remedy would be available. Such evidence,
if it could be marshalled, would make available the remedy of con-
structive trust or the remedy of equitable lien to assist in specific resti-
tution for a plaintiff.
The terms "fiduciary relationship" and "confidential relationship"
are found in several fields of law. They are almost always dealt with
in actions of an equitable nature. These terms appear to have been
deliberately left vague by the courts in order that categories, complete
and perfect, would not give the unscrupulous person the opportunity to
12 "The principle of law recognized by these cases is this: That the courts
will not encourage the violation of agreements by relieving the defaulting party
from the intentional and unjustifiable breach of his agreement and allowing him
to recover pro tanto for the part performance of a contract that is entire; where
the other contracting party is not at fault and has not waived a full performance
by acceptance or otherwise." Goldsmith v. Hand, 26 Ohio St. 101, 106 (1875).
13 Higby v. Whittaker, 8 Ohio 198 (1837).
14 Village of Wells v. Layne-Minnesota Co., 240 Minn. 132, 60 N.W.2d 621
(1953) ; City of Cleveland v. Herron, 102 Ohio St. 218, 131 N.E. 489 (1921).
15 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1454A (2d ed. 1937).
16 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1105 (1951).
17 "This is no more and no less than can be said for the remedy in damages.
When the law gives a judgment for damages for breach of contract it is no more
enforcing the contract of the parties than it is doing when a judgment for
restitution is entered. The contracting parties have no more expressed their assent
to pay damages in case of a breach, except perhaps in cases where damages have
been 'liquidated,' than they have to the payment of restitution in the case of a
breach." 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1106 (1951).
18 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1454 (2d ed. 1937).
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operate just inside the law.19 There are, of course, certain relationships
which are clearly fiduciary in nature: executor and beneficiaries, guardian
and ward, attorney and client, trustee and beneficiary, partners, joint
adventurers, officers and directors of a corporation and the corporation,
agent and principal, trustee in bankruptcy, spiritual advisor and devotee,
doctor and patient, to name some but not all.2" In all of these instances
there is a well-established category of law which defines the duties
arising out of the relationships which, by their innate character as in-
stitutions of the law, cause the duties to arise. Confidential relationship
includes "that large miscellaneous list of cases where actual trust and
confidence of a high type creates a corresponding duty, but where no
tag or label can be given to the relationship except the broad term of
confidential relationship."'" This kind of relationship places emphasis
upon the attitude of the parties rather than upon the innate nature of
the relationship as in the fiduciary examples. Once a relationship has
been declared fiduciary or confidential, whether these arise from a
moral, social, domestic or personal relation, it is possible the equitable
remedies may be used, for the confidential relationship alone is evidence
sufficient to cause the courts to vindicate it.22
Numerous attempts have been made in the past to find confidential
relationships between parties in ordinary business relations, but the courts
have generally denied that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed
without more evidence of the comparative strength of the parties' posi-
tions.2" However, there are a considerable number of cases which in-
dicate that such confidential relationships may arise from a business
context where other evidence is present beyond the mere existence of
the business association.24.
19 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 200 (13th ed. 1886).
20 See VINTER, FIDuCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS (3d ed. 1955).
21 Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforcible Express Trusts, 13 CORN.
L.Q. 237, 248 (1928).
22 Dietz v. Dietz, 244 Minn. 330, 70 N.W.2d 281 (1955); POMEROY, Eau=TY
JURISPRUDENCE § 1045 (4th ed. 1918); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 190 (1937);
Cardozo stated, "Unjust enrichment under cover of a relation of confidence puts
the Court in motion," in Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245, 253, 139 N.E. 255, 258
(1922).
23 Eckert v. Miller, 57 Ariz. 94, 111 P.2d 60 (1941) ; Abeleia v. Pepper,
8 Cal. 2d 25, 63 P.2d 817 (1936); Santa Anita Corp. v. Walker, 106 Colo. 465,
106 P.2d 459 (1940) ; People ex rel. Nelson v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 306 Il.
App. 15, 28 N.E.2d 154- (1940); Cranwell v. Oglesby, 299 Mass. 148, 12 N.E.2d
81 (1937) ; In re Morrish's Estate, 156 Pa. Super. 394, 40 A.2d 907 (1945).
24 Lawson v. Haynes, 170 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1948), 18 U. CIN. L. REv. 230
(1949); Anglo-Calif. Nael. Bank v. Philpot, 148 Cal. App. 2d 469, 306 P.2d 970
(1957); Carter v. Abramo, 201 Md. 339, 93 A.2d 546 (1953) ; Warsofsky v.
Sherman, 326 Mass. 290, 93 N.E.2d 612 (1950) ; Errico v. Scopollitti, 131 N.J.
Eq. 125, 24 A.2d 384 (1942).
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Principles have been stated by the courts to define the confidential
relationship.25 None of these statements has been able to encompass its
evolution. We find, therefore, that the confidential relationship arises
from the cumulative effect of evidence. Factors that have been
meaningful are those which deal with dependency, mental condition,
residence, age, domination, physical condition, education, business experi-
ence, length of dealing, joint ownership, friendship, blood or family
relationships, passage of time and control over affairs. No factor by
itself controls the finding of law or fact that there is a fiduciary or
confidential relationship.
It has been suggested that an extremely important factor which
does not appear in the reported opinions is demeanor evidence which
could play a decisive role where there is little other evidence upon
which to rely in determining whether a confidential relationship exists. 26
THE REMEDIES
In considering the constructive trust as primarily a remedy only
where fraud, mistake,2 8 undue influence 29 and duress3 ° can be proved
to establish the restitution right, we are neglecting the area of simple
breach of contract. Indeed, there is some evidence that we even neglect
its use in the other areas as well.3 ' A constructive trust has been termed
ccthe formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression.
When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder
of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial in-
terest, equity converts him into a trustee.""2 "A constructive trust is
25 See Stepp v. Frampton, 179 Pa. 284, 289, 36 At. 177, 179 (1897), which
quotes BEACH, MODERN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE-§ 125 (1873): "But when the
relations existing between the contracting parties appear to be of such a character
as to render it certain that they do not deal on 'equal terms, but that on the one
side . . . from overmastering influence, or on the other side, from weakness,
dependence or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage in a transaction is
rendered probable, then the burden is shifted and the transaction is presumed
void .... This principle is of very general application, and the courts have always
been careful not to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its
exercise."
26 Note, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 724 (1949).
27 Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136, 35 B.U.L. Rav. 604:
(1955).
28 O'Brien v. Elder, 250 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1957).
2 9 Batchelor v. Mitchell, 238 N.C. 351, 78 S.E.2d 240 (1953).
30 Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 35 N.W.2d 203 (1948).
31 Vanneman, The Constructive Trust: A Neglected Remedy in Ohio, 10
U. CINc. L. REV. 366 (1936).
32 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378,
382 (1919). See Newton v. Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399 (1877).
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then the remedial device through which preference of self is made
subordinate to loyalty to others."
33
These definitions make this remedy one which clearly asserts the
right of restitution which could arise from a fiduciary or confidential
connection between parties to a contract which has been broken in order
to secure specific restitution of property.3" Some opinions seem to require
the presence of fraud,35 but these really mean only constructive fraud
such as that arising when a confidential relationship is ignored or undue
influence used.3"
It has been suggested that the remedy of equitable lien is really an
"offshoot" of constructive trust. It is the end result of tracing in its
most frequent modern application.37  The Restatement,38  however,
limits the equitable lien to the function of reaching specific property
and holding it as security to prevent unjust enrichment.39 This seems
to be in accord with the cases. The equitable lien remedy is more easily
granted than that of constructive trust in the absence of any additional
facts such as fraud, the fiduciary or confidential relationship, duress,
undue influence or mistake. Aside from the support cases40 or specific
statutory authorization 41 the courts have been reluctant to allow specific
restitution to the grantor of land for breach of an agreement by the
33Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 467, 164 N.E. 545, 551 (1928). See
dissent of Williams, J., in Olaff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 444, 195 N.E. 838,
843 (1935); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
34 Dean Roscoe Pound has stated: "A group of cases involving constructive
trusts invites consideration of what such a trust really is. An express trust is a
substantive institution. Constructive trust on the other hand is purely a remedial
institution. As the chancellor acted in personam, one of the most effective remedial
expedients at his command was to treat a defendant as if he were a trustee and
put pressure upon his person to compel him to act accordingly. Thus constructive
trust could be used in a variety of situations, sometimes to provide a remedy
better suited to the circumstances of the particular case, where the suit was
founded on another theory, as in the cases of reformation, of specific performance,
of fraudulent conveyance and of what the civilian would call the exclusion of
unworthy heirs, and sometimes to develop a new field of equitable interposition,
as in what we have come to think the typical case of constructive trust, namely,
specific restitution of a received benefit in order to prevent unjust enrichment."
Pound, The Progress of the Law, Equity, 33 HARv. L. REv. 420, 421 (1920).
35 Taft v. Guardian Trust Co., 32 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 345, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 54
(1934).
36 Costigan, The Classification of Trusts, 27 HARv. L. REV. 437-39 (1914).
37 DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 34 (1951).
38 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 161 (1937).
39In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1931);
Klaustermeyer v. Cleveland Trust Co., 89 Ohio St. 142, 105 N.E. 278 (1913).
40 Lowman v. Lowman, 105 Ind. App. 102, 12 N.E.2d 961 (1938); Beard v.
Beard, 200 Ky. 4, 254 S.W. 430 (1923); Enslein v. Enslein, 84 Ohio App. 259,
82 N.E.2d 555 (1948).
41 Petty v. Hall, 257 Ala. 145, 57 So. 2d 620 (1952).
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grantee.42 Specific restitution is given in such cases43 and the insolvency
of the defendant will make it even more likely that the remedy of
constructive trust will be decreed." Certain classifications of contract
cases in which constructive trust would be granted have been sug-
gested,4 5 but this appears to defeat the purpose of having such remedies
in our law. The scope of the equitable remedies has been able to develop
in part due to the lack of classification. It is true that additional classi-
fications do arise, but no road block has stopped them. When the
interests of third parties, who are purchasers or creditors, are in conflict
with interests protected by the remedies of constructive trust or equi-
table lien, these can be weighed against each other. Lawyers will always
try to formulate rules by formulating all common denominators found
in a variety of situations into patterns.
John Dawson has stated the problem in this manner:
The danger we face when this stage is reached comes
from human beings themselves. One of the traits which dis-
tinguish human beings from the elephants and great cats is
their possession of an ethical faculty, including a sense of
justice. This faculty will probably never be fully understood,
though we find that it exists. It ensures that the disapproval
of enrichment through another's loss, once formulated as
motive in particular cases, will tend to become an imperative.
A useful and necessary principle becomes something more
than a 'general guide. In some of its aspects it is a rule. It
seems so simple and so clearly just. Why should we not
extend it.?'6
CONCLUSION
Once a right to restitution has been established to insure against
unjust enrichment in cases of a defendant's default on a contract
through substantial breach after performance, we should look to equi-
table restitutionary remedies as well as the legal restitutionary remedies.
Although the equitable remedies of constructive trust and equitable lien
are granted in simple breach of contract cases in limited areas to give
specific restitution of property or to secure an interest in specific property,
this is done reluctantly by the courts. It is suggested that a confidential
or fiduciary relationship can arise from a cumulation of factual evidence
and assist not only in establishing the right of restitution but also in
42 See Haydon v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 222 Mo. 126, 121 S.W. 15 (1909);
Chicago, T. & M.C. Ry. v. Titterington, 84 Tex. 218, 19 S.W. 472 (1892).
43 Piper v. Queeney, 282 Pa. 135, 127 At. 474 (1925).
44 Fletcher v. Fletcher, 158 Ga. 899, 124 S.E. 722 (1924).
45 NEWMAN, TRUSTS 243 (1955).
46 DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 151 (1951).
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making more available the equitable remedies which arise to protect the
party who suffers loss as a result of the breach of duty imposed by
such a relationship. This would be further reinforced where a de-
fendant is insolvent.
We should not attempt to overformulate the rights or remedies of
restitution. We should be mindful of the interests of others which
may be diminished by permitting such rights and remedies. Above all,
however, we must have an open end to these principles to make possible
the continued understanding of our own ethical faculties as human
beings.
